Appendix IV
Sardar Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7-November,
1950
D.O. No. 821-DPM/50
New Delhi, 7th Nov., 1950
New Delhi, 7th Nov., 1950
My dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between
the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the
Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to
our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but, I regret to say that
neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government
have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is
that at a crucial period they managed to to instil into our Ambassador a false
sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by
peaceful means. There can be no doubt that, during the period covered by this
correspondence, the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on
Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of
perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to
be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of
Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears
that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at
great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and
actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams,
there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two
representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is
impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to
China from Anglo-American machination in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put
faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as
tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if
genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them,
indicates that, even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the
Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of
"Whoever is not with them being against them," this is a significant pointer, of
which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the
Russian Camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese
entry into the UNO and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question
of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to
allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims, in our discussions
and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UNO. In spite of this,
China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us
with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of
scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any
further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions,
friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently
suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have
failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an ac of gross
discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the
entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in wild insinuation that our
attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a
friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
In the background of this, we have to consider what new
situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we know it,
and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history, we have
seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalaya has been
regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a
friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had
their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontier. In 1914,
we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese.
We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty
relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature.
The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can,
therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations
which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting
pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been
functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer
divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and
north-east, we have, on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically
and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of
the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities
to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China
and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no
shield against imperialism and that Communists are as good or as bas as
imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the
Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They
have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has
no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement.
Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the
expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of
ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological
expansion lie concealed racial, national and historical claims. The danger from
the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist.
While our western and north-eastern threats to security are still as prominent
as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for
the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on
tow fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the
calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now
have to reckon with Communist China in the north and north-east-a communist
China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem
friendly towards us.
4. Let me also consider the political considerations on this
potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern or north-eastern approaches
consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal Areas in Assam. From
the point of view of communications they are weak spots. Continuous defensive
lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police
protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There too, our outposts
do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us, is, by no
means, close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no
established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas
are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have
not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and to the hill
tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with
them, but their influence was, in no way, friendly to India or Indians. In
Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that
discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quite, but its affinity
with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based
almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the
population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these
circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them
defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed, and that difficulty can be
got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am
sure the Chinese and their source of inspirations, Soviet Russia, would not miss
any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their
ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement, therefore,
the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be
vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of
the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness
in formulating out objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those
objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so
evident.
5. Side by side with these external dangers we shall now have
to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send
to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's
appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found
some difficulty in contacting Communists abroad, our in getting supplies of
arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with difficult Burmese
and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now
have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese Communists, and through
them to other foreign Communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and
Communists would not be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated
communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with Communist
threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers where,
for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on Communist
arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which
we must come to an early decision os that we can as said earlier, formulate the
objectives of our policy and decide the methods by which those actions will have
to be fairly comprehensive involving not only our defence strategy and state of
preparation but also problems of internal security to deal with which we have
not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and
political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already
referred.
6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in
setting out all these problems. am, however, giving below some of the problems,
which in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our
administrative or military policies and measures to implement them:
a. A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
b. An examination of our military position and such
redisposition of our force as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of
guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of
dispute.
c. The question of Chinese entry into U.N.O. In view of the
rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing
with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer.
There would probably be a threat in the U.N.O. virtually to
outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean War. We must
determine our attitude on this question also.
f. The political and administrative steps which we should take
to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontiers. This would include the
whole of the border i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal
Territory in Assam.
g. Measures of internal security in the border areas as well
as the States flanking those areas such as U.P., Bihar Bengal and Assam.
h. Improvement of our communications, road rail, air and
wireless in these areas, and intelligence of frontier outposts.
i. Policing and intelligence of frontier posts.
j. The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at
Gyangtse and Yatung and the force which we have in operation in Tibet to guard
the trade routes.
k. The policy in regard to McMahon line.
7. These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It
is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider
questions of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma.
This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very
important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into
closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in this dealings
with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on
us , China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely
undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its
present position, Burma might offer an easier problem for China, and therefore,
might claim its first attention.
8. I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion
on these problems and decide on such steps as we might thinks to be immediately
necessary and direct quick examination of other problems with a view to taking
early measures to deal with them.
Yours
(sd.) Vallabhbhai Patel
The Hon'ble Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi India's Ambassador in Peking at the time was K. M. Pannikar
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi India's Ambassador in Peking at the time was K. M. Pannikar
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