Having a business presence spanning much of the subcontinent is a feature
that has distinguished the Marwaris from other prominent trading communities.
The latter — the Parsis, Sindhis, Gujarati Banias/Jains, Lohanas and Bhatias,
Nattukottai Chettiars, Punjabi Khatris/Aroras or Muslim Memons, Khojas and
Bohras — have historically had more geographically concentrated inland
operations: Some of them had predominantly overseas mercantile or investment
interests.
The ability to draw on extensive pan-Indian
bazaar connections made a
huge difference during the interwar years, more so with the Great Depression. It
tilted the balance against foreign trade, in favour of those whose business
activity was largely domestic-focused.
The Marwaris were the ones to make the most out of the disruption of normal
trading channels during wartime. The speculative profits earned from
fatka and
teji-mandi transactions — that rose manifold at the
numerous commodities exchanges formed in this period — they partly funnelled
into industry. That also included buying out the units of beleaguered European
managing agencies, to whom they were previously brokers and financiers.
Dalmia’s exploits
Exemplifying this trajectory was Ramkrishna Dalmia, arguably the greatest
Marwari businessman before Independence.
Originally from Chirawa in Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan’s Shekhawati
region, Dalmia went to Kolkata to join his maternal uncle’s bullion business. In
no time, the ambitious young man had launched his own operations, starting with
gambling on silver prices during World War-I, followed by shares at the Calcutta
Stock Exchange and trading in commodities.
Dalmia’s indus
trial debut was through a sugar mill in 1933 at a site in Bihar’s Rohtas
district. Over time, it also housed plants manufacturing cement, asbestos,
paper, board, vanaspati, sulphuric acid, chlorine, caustic soda and bleaching
powder. These units — besides a foundry, central workshop, power house and a
rail feeder line connecting the 3,800-acre complex — became part of a single
entity, Rohtas Industries, that may have well anticipated today’s much-touted
Special Economic Zones.
But Dalmia did not stop there. In 1937, he challenged the quasi-monopoly of
ACC — a combine of 10 cement firms formed only the year before — by
commissioning plants at Karachi and Dandot (both now in Pakistan), Charkhi Dadri
(Haryana) and Trichy (Tamil Nadu), apart from the Rohtas Industries facility.
The ensuing price war lasted till 1941, when the World War boom lifted
sentiments.
From speculation, trading and manufacturing, Dalmia’s next port of call was
finance. In 1943, he promoted Bharat Bank Ltd. This, along with two insurance
ventures (Bharat Insurance and Bharat Fire & General Insurance), provided a
captive fund pool, especially for the takeover binge that Dalmia indulged in
over the next few years.
The companies he bought — with interests as diverse as flour-milling, sugar,
jute and cotton textiles, civil aviation, railways, coal mines, electricity
supply and newspapers — belonged mainly to British concerns like Govan Brothers,
Andrew Yule and Bennett Coleman, whose owners weren’t too bullish on business
prospects in Independent India. By 1948, he also had controlling stakes in
Punjab National Bank.
The downside
Ramkrishna Dalmia’s case is illustrative on three counts. The first, of
course, is the raw drive and venturous spirit of a first-generation entrepreneur
it highlights.
The second is the role of kinship and community ties, a valuable resource
pool not available to every aspiring tycoon. Dalmia benefited from learning the
ropes under an uncle, well entrenched in Kolkata’s Marwari trading circles. Even
his initial foray into sugar was with a big land-owning relative in Bihar. All
the subsequent ventures involved his brother, Jaidayal and son-in-law, Sahu
Shanti Prasad Jain – under the ‘Dalmia-Sahu Jain’ group banner.
The third element was the extent to which Dalmia’s business operations
remained grounded in the
bazaar. The ‘speculative’ phase did not end with
putting up factories. Rather, the proclivity for playing the market — including
diverting public issue proceeds from one company to finance the activities of
others, or booking fictitious losses on share transactions between group
entities — only rose with time.
The above three facets — inherent risk-taking disposition, ability to
leverage community resources, and overwhelming
bazaar orientation even
after entry into the ‘modern’ industrial sphere — can be said to apply to
Marwari enterprise broadly, with their associated strengths and weaknesses.
In Dalmia’s case, his adroit speculative skills eventually got the better of
him. As details emerged of how deposit and premium monies from banks and
insurance firms controlled by the group were used to fund acquisitions — of
Bennett Coleman, among others — he had to suffer the ignominy of a two-year jail
term in 1956, just like Satyam Computers’ Ramalinga Raju some five decades
later.
Even before that, the Dalmia-Sahu Jain empire was partitioned among his
brother’s and son-in-law’s families, for reasons still shrouded in mystery and
intrigue. Many of the erstwhile group’s concerns, including Rohtas Industries,
have since folded up, while the surviving ones, save Bennett Coleman, are not
really in the top league.
The route ahead
That links up with two major limitations of Marwari, or even Indian,
enterprise in general.
The first has to do with entrepreneurial zeal and ‘animal spirits’,
which, in most family-owned businesses, tends to disappear along with the
founding patriarchs. The Bangurs, Modis, Singhanias, Shrirams and Dalmias
represent this trend in varying degrees.
The same possibly holds for the Birlas as well: Among its various factions
today, only the $ 40 billion Aditya Birla Group can measure up to, if not
surpass, the vision of G.D. Birla. And that happened because his grandson,
Aditya Vikram, chose to tread an independent path. In the seventies — when most
others, particularly Marwaris, were happy doing business domestically — he
established viscose staple fibre, spun yarn, carbon black and palm oil refining
units all across South-East Asia. The latter’s son, Kumar Mangalam, has gone one
step further, in aiming for
global leadership in the industries where the
group is active: Viscose and acrylic fibre, carbon black, aluminium and cement.
That calls for no less ambition and animal spirits, even if more evolved and
organised than innately present in first-generation entrepreneurs.
The second limitation flows from an inability to transcend the
bazaar that provided the basis for capital accumulation for most Marwari
firms (unlike for say, an Infosys or Dr Reddy’s Laboratories). But
innovativeness in trading and financing – where there’s probably not much JP
Morgan, Goldman Sachs or even Walmart can teach our Banias — is inadequate and
certainly cannot substitute for knowledge of the factory floor and production
processes.
Weakness on the latter front may not have mattered in a closed domestic
economy, where the trader-industrialist’s choice of industry was dictated more
by the profits it offered and the availability of licenses at that point of
time. It was both theoretically and practically feasible, then, to straddle
diverse industries and operate suboptimal capacity plants using borrowed,
outdated technologies. These could be ‘managed’ even from a distance, without
going too much into the technical details of manufacture.
The
partha system of accounting devised by the Marwaris was perfectly
suited for this purpose. Under it, every group firm provided informed estimates
of how much it cost to manufacture a given quantity of their product. Based on
it and the expected profits corresponding to the sale price, the promoters
sitting at their
gaddis in Kolkata or Mumbai compared the unit’s actual
daily earnings to the normative
partha cash flows.
If substantial deviations occurred, a trouble-shooter was sent to check out
the ground situation and report back. In extreme cases — rare in a protected
economic environment — it led to a shake-up of the plant team or closure of the
business.
The above detached approach has limited relevance in the post-liberalisation
era, where the success of Lakshmi Mittal, Kumar Mangalam Birla or Anil Agarwal
owes largely to their focusing on particular industries and building
global-scale state-of-the-art plants.
While their in-born talents in buying and selling or having connections from
relatives already in business will always stand the Marwaris in good stead, that
by itself is not enough in today’s world where other things are increasingly
mattering more.
(
Concluded)
The two-part article on Marwari enterprise and its
present-day relevance.