Thursday, May 31, 2012


Clarification On Reopening Assessments Due To Retrospective Amendment introduced by Finance Act, 2012

Clarification regarding reopening of completed assessments on accounts of clarificatory amendments introduced by Finance Act, 2012, in Section 2 clause (14), Section 2 clause (47), Section 9 and Section 195 with retrospective effect
Letter [F.No.500/111/2009-FTD-1(Pt.)], dated 29-5-2012
The Finance Act, 2012 has introduced certain clarificatory amendments in section 2 clause (14), Section 2 clause (47), Section 9 and Section 195, of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“Act”), with retrospective effect from 01.04.1962 or 01.04.1976, whereby meaning of various terms used in these sections have been clarified in order to remove any doubt regarding their interpretations.
2. These amendments have been introduced retrospectively in order to clarify the legislative intent and state the position of law from the date of coming into effect of these sections in the Act.
3. Doubts have been raised in various quarters about the implication of these amendments on the assessments that have already been completed and attained finality.
4. The Board, after due consideration, hereby directs that in case where assessment proceedings have been completed under section 143(3) of the Act, before the first day of April, 2012, and no notice for reassessment has been issued prior to that date; then such cases shall not be reopened under section 147/148 of the Act on account of the abovementioned clarificatory amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2012. However, assessment or any other order which stand validated due to the said clarificatory amendments in the Finance Act, 2012 would of course be enforced.
5. This may be brought to the notice of all officers in your region immediately.Source:taxguru

Wednesday, May 30, 2012



CS CONVENES MEETING WITH IT OFFICIALS, GOVT CONFIDENT THAT MATTER WILL BE RESOLVED SOON

source:SikkimNowGANGTOK, 30 May: The State Government has taken serious note on the Income Tax Office’s decision to have IT Exemption Certificate applicants from Sikkim approach the IT Office in Matigara, Siliguri. Sikkim Subjects and their descendents are exempt from paying Income Tax on incomes earned in Sikkim. Thus far, they could apply for and receive IT Exemption certificates [for such conveniences as not having tax deducted at source] from the IT Office in Gangtok itself [for details, read news-report headlined, “Sikkim applicants now required to approach Matigara IT office for IT Exemption Certs”, published in NOW! issue dated 28 May 2012].
An IPR Press release informs that on 28 May itself, the Chief Secretary convened a meeting in his office with IT Commissioner, Siliguri, CL Denzongpa, Assistant Commissioner, IT, (TDS) Siliguri, DN Bhutia, and Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Gangtok, LD Lepcha, “to address the issue that was reflected in the local news papers, so as to assuage the apprehensions of the people accordingly”.
The release details that at the meeting, the Chief Secretary, “in no uncertain terms, very strongly advocated the fact that an Income Tax Office located in Gangtok was for all practical purposes to aid and assist the people of Sikkim in filling their returns, etc”.
He strongly objected to the move to shift the issue of Income Tax Exemption Certificate to Siliguri and “even questioned the logic of having a full-fledged IT Office located in Gangtok”.
“It was very clearly known to the delegation of IT officials that they should re-look at the whole issue and make full use of the IT office in Gangtok and continue with the process of IT Exemption Certificates being issued from Gangtok instead of Siliguri. This would not only cause convenience to the people of Sikkim, but would also justify the logic of having an IT office located in Gangtok. The Chief Secretary also informed the IT officials, that either an officer be posted at Gangtok or the Assistant commissioner of IT, Circle Gangtok be delegated with the powers for issuing such IT Exemption Certificates,” the release states.
The matter is now being taken up with the Commissioner, IT (TDS), Kolkata by the Commissioner, IT, Siliguri under whose jurisdiction the matter falls, and would be sorted out in due course of time, the release assures further.

I-T dept will not re-open cases prior to April 1, 2012: Pranab

PTI
source:Hindubisiness   
Mr Pranab Mukherjee.
Mr Pranab Mukherjee.
Providing comfort to worried foreign investors, the Finance Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee on Wednesday said the Income-Tax Department will not reopen cases where assessment proceedings had been finalised before April 1, 2012.
“I gave a commitment in Parliament with regard to retrospective amendments that CBDT (Central Board of Direct Taxes) will issue a policy circular to clarify that in cases where assessment proceedings have become final before first day of April 2012... Such cases shall not be reopened. Now CBDT has issued a circular in this regard”, he said while inaugurating Pratyaksh Kar Bhawan here.
Mr Mukherjee, in the Budget 2012—13, proposed to amend the Income-Tax Act, 1961 with retrospective effect to tax Vodafone-type merger and acquisition deals done overseas that involve domestic assets. 

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

I T issue taken up by State Government


In reference to the press release in Gangtok on  May 09, 2012 regarding the issue of Income Tax Exemption Certificates from Siliguri has been  immediately taken up by the State Government. On 28th of May 2012, a meeting was convened by the Chief Secretary at 11. 30 am in his chamber which was attended by Shri C.L.Denzongpa, Commissioner, IT, Siliguri, Shri D.N.Bhutia, Assistant Commissioner, IT, (TDS) Siliguri and Shri L.D.Lepcha, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Gangtok. The meeting convened by the Chief Secretary was to address the issue that was reflected in the local news papers, so as to assuage the apprehensions of the people accordingly.
In the meeting, the Chief Secretary in no uncertain terms, very strongly advocated the fact that an Income Tax Office located in Gangtok, was for all practical purposes to aid and assist the people of Sikkim in filling their returns, etc. With the view of shifting the issue of Income Tax Exemption Certificate to Siliguri was strongly objected to by the Chief Secretary, who even questioned the logic of having a full-fledged IT Office located in Gangtok. It was very clearly known to the delegation of IT officials that they should re-look at the whole issue and make full use of the IT office in Gangtok and continue with the process of IT Exemption Certificates being issued from Gangtok instead of Siliguri. This would not only cause convenience to the people of Sikkim, but would also justify the logic of having an IT office located in Gangtok. The Chief Secretary also informed the IT officials, that either an officer be posted at Gangtok or the Assistant commissioner of IT, Circle Gangtok be delegated with the powers for issuing such IT Exemption Certificates. The matter is now being taken up with the Commissioner, IT (TDS), Kolkata by the Commissioner, IT, Siliguri under whose jurisdiction the matter falls, and would be sorted out in due course of time.(source:IPR)

Friday, May 25, 2012


Income Tax department working on strategy to prevent corruption



NEW DELHI: The Income Tax Department is working on a comprehensive strategy to deal with corruption within the organisation.

The work relating to identification of potential areas of corruption related to the organisational activities and development of an action plan for its mitigation has commenced, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) said.

"The action plan is likely to be finalised by December 10, 2012," the Results-Framework Document (RFD) for 2012-13 of the Board said.

CBDT is the statutory authority functioning under the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1963. The officials of the Board also functions as a Division of the Ministry of Finance, dealing with matters relating to levy and collection of direct taxes.

The RFD further said that "for financial year 2012-13, the department is concentrating on providing better taxpayer's services with the view to enhance voluntary compliance".

The Board, it said, has carefully reviewed its priorities with a view to sharpen the different mechanism for achieving effective and meaningful implementation of taxpayer services that will also facilitate voluntary compliance for the department.

Efforts of the Board are on reducing the compliance costs of the taxpayers, and intend to focus on better communication with taxpayers, development of human resources in the department and strengthening IT enabled services, the document added.

To achieve its objectives, the CBDT plans to fill up the existing vacancies in the department in a phased manner, provide proper training and educating taxpayers.

The direct tax collection target for 2012-13 fiscal is Rs 5.70 lakh crore. The direct tax mop in the previous fiscal was about Rs 4.93 lakh crore (provisional estimates).

Thursday, May 24, 2012


Stamp Papers valid even after six month of Purchase

Friday, May 25, 2012, 0:48

According to  Supreme Court Judgement dated 19-02-2008 in the case of  Thiruvengada Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and Anr., the stamp papers do not have any expiry period. Relevant extract from SC judgement is reproduced herein below:

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, nowhere prescribes any expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the date on which it was so surrendered. The stipulation of the period of six months prescribed in Section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a stamp paper, to use it within six months. Therefore, there is no impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the proposed date of execution, being used for a document.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Thiruvengada Pillai

Vs.

Navaneethammal & Anr. [2008]

19 February 2008

ORDER

R. V. Raveendran & P.Sathasivam R. V. Raveendran, J.

This appeal by special leave is by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance – OS No.290/1980 on the file of District Munsiff, Tindivanam. Pleadings

2. In the plaint, the plaintiff (appellant) alleged that the first defendant (Adilakshmi) agreed to sell the suit schedule property to him under an agreement of sale dated 5.1.1980 for a consideration of Rs.3,000/-, and received Rs.2,000/- as advance. She agreed to execute a sale deed by receiving the balance consideration of Rs.1,000/- within three months.

Possession of the suit property was delivered to him, under the said agreement. He issued a notice dated 14.2.1980 calling upon the first defendant to receive the balance price and execute the sale deed. The first defendant sent a reply denying the agreement. To avoid performing the agreement of sale, the first defendant executed a nominal sale deed in regard to the suit property in favour of the second defendant (first respondent herein), who was her close relative. The said sale was neither valid nor binding on him. On the said averments, he sought specific performance of the agreement of sale, against the defendant, alleging that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

3. The defendants denied the allegation that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale dated 5.1.1980 in favour of the plaintiff or that she had delivered possession of the suit property to him. They contended that plaintiff had concocted and forged the document with the help of his henchmen to defraud the defendants. They claimed that the first defendant had executed a valid sale deed dated 11.2.1980 in favour of the second defendant and had delivered possession of the suit property to her; and that the second defendant had put up a hut in the schedule property and was actually residing therein. The second defendant raised an additional contention that she was a bona fide purchaser for value and therefore, the sale in her favour was valid.

4. During the pendency of the suit first defendant died, and the third defendant (second respondent herein) was impleaded as her legal representative, who adopted the written statement of the second defendant.

Issues and the Judgment

5. On the said pleadings, three issues were framed by the trial court :

(i) whether the agreement put forth by the plaintiff was true or concocted ?

(ii) whether the second defendant had purchased the suit property for valid consideration ? and

(iii) whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of specific performance ?

The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and the scribe of the agreement (Ramaswami Pillai) as PW-2 and an attesting witness to the sale agreement (Venkatesha Pillai) as PW-3. The agreement of sale was exhibited as Ex. A-1. The notice and reply were marked as Ex. A2 and A4. The second defendant, (purchaser of the site), gave evidence as DW-1 and the third defendant, who was also a witness to the sale deed dated 11.2.1980, was examined as DW-2. The sale deed dated 11.2.1980 executed by first defendant in favour of second defendant was marked as Ex.B2 and previous title deed was exhibited as Ex. B4. The plaintiff and his witnesses gave evidence that the sale agreement was duly executed by first defendant in favour of plaintiff. The defendants gave evidence about the sale in favour of second defendant and denied execution of any agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff.

6. The trial court after appreciating the evidence, dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 28.2.1984. It held that the agreement of sale put forth by plaintiff was false and must have been created after the sale on 11.2.1980 in favour of second defendant, by using some old stamp papers in his possession. The said finding was based on the following facts and circumstances :

(a) The sale agreement (A-1) was not executed on currently purchased stamp paper, but was written on two stamp papers, one purchased on 25.8.1973 in the name of Thiruvengadam and another purchased on 7.8.1978 in the name of Thiruvengadam Pillai.

(b) The two attestors to the agreement were close relatives of plaintiff. One of them was Kannan, brother of the plaintiff and he was not examined. The other was Venkatesa Pillai, uncle of plaintiff examined as PW3. The scribe (PW-2) was a caste-man of plaintiff. Their evidence was not trustworthy.

(c) Though the agreement of sale recited that the possession of the suit property was delivered to plaintiff, no such possession was delivered. On the other hand, the second defendant was put in possession on execution of the sale deed and she put up a thatched hut in the schedule property and was in actual physical possession. This falsified the agreement.

(d) If really there was an agreement of sale, in the normal course, the plaintiff would have obtained the title deeds from the first defendant. But the earlier title deeds were not delivered to him. On the other hand, they were delivered to the second defendant who produced them as Ex.B3 and Ex.B4.

(e) In spite of defendants denying the agreement (Ex.A1), the plaintiff failed to discharge his onus to prove that execution of the agreement as he did not seek reference to a fingerprint expert to establish that the thumb impression on the agreement was that of the first defendant.

The first & second appeals

6. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Sub-Court, Tindivanam. The first appellate court allowed the plaintiff’s appeal by judgment dated 12.1.1987, held that the agreement of sale was proved and decreed the suit granting specific performance. The following reasons were given by the first appellant court in support of its finding :

(a) The evidence of PW1 (plaintiff), the scribe (PW2) and the attestor (PW3) proved the due execution of the agreement by the first defendant. As the scribe (PW2) was not related to plaintiff and as PW3 was not a close relative of plaintiff, their evidence could not have been rejected.

(b) The burden of proving that the agreement of sale was concocted and forged was on the defendants and they ought to have taken steps to have the document examined by a Finger Print expert, to establish that the disputed thumb mark in the agreement of sale (Ex.A1), was different from the admitted thumb mark of the first defendant in the sale deed (Ex.B2). They failed to do so.

(c) There appeared to be no marked difference between the finger impression in the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) and the finger impression in the sale deed in favour of the second defendant (Ex.B2), on a perusal of the said two documents. Therefore, it could be inferred that first defendant had executed the agreement.

(d) Execution of the agreement of sale on two stamp papers purchased on different dates, did not invalidate the agreement.

8. Being aggrieved, the second defendant filed a second appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit, by judgment dated 17.2.1999. The High Court while restoring the decision of the trial court held that the agreement of sale was not genuine for the following reasons:

(i) The first appellate court had placed the onus wrongly on the defendants to prove the negative. As the first defendant denied execution of the agreement, the burden of establishing the execution of document, was on the plaintiff. The plaintiff had failed to establish by acceptable evidence that Ex. A-1 was a true and valid agreement of sale. The evidence, examined as a whole, threw considerable doubt as to whether it was truly and validly executed.

(ii) A perusal of the agreement (Ex.A1) showed that the thumb impression was very pale and not clear. The first appellate court could not, by a casual comparison of the disputed thumb impression in the agreement with the admitted thumb impression in the sale deed, record a finding that there were no marked differences in the thumb impressions in the two documents (Ex.A1 and Ex.B2). In the absence of an expert’s opinion that the thumb impression on the agreement of the sale was that of the first defendant, the first appellate court ought not to have concluded that the agreement of sale was executed by the first defendant.

(iii) In the normal course, an agreement would be executed on stamp papers purchased immediately prior to the execution of the agreement. The fact that the agreement was written on two stamp papers bearing the dates 25.8.1973 and 7.8.1978 purchased in two different names showed that it was not genuine, but was anti-dated and forged.

(iv) The attesting witnesses to the agreement of sale were close relatives of plaintiff. Their evidence was not trustworthy.

Points for consideration

8. The said judgment of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The appellant contended that having regard to the provisions of Evidence Act, 1872, there was nothing improper in the first appellate court comparing the disputed thumb impression in Ex. A-1 with the admitted thumb impression of first defendant in Ex. B-2; and the finding of the first appellate court on such comparison, that there were no marked differences between the two thumb impressions, being a finding of fact, was not open to interference in second appeal. It was next contended that the execution of the agreement of sale was duly proved by the evidence of plaintiff (PW1), the scribe (PW-2) and one of the attesting witnesses (PW3). It was pointed out there was no evidence to rebut the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 regarding due execution as first defendant died without giving evidence, and as the defendants did not seek reference to a finger print expert to prove that the thumb impression on the agreement of sale was not that of first defendant. It was submitted that an agreement cannot be doubted or invalidated merely on account of the fact that the two stamp papers used for the agreement were purchased on different dates. The Appellant therefore submitted that the sale agreement was duly proved.

9. On the contentions urged, the following questions arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the agreement of sale executed on two stamp papers purchased on different dates and more than six months prior to date of execution is not valid?

(ii) Whether the first appellate court was justified in comparing the disputed thumb impression with the admitted thumb impression and recording a finding about the authenticity of the thumb impression, without the benefit of any opinion of an expert?

(iii) Whether the High Court erred in reversing the judgment of the first appellate court in second appeal? Re : Question (i)

11. The Trial Court and the High Court have doubted the genuineness of the agreement dated 5.1.1980 because it was written on two stamp papers purchased on 25.8.1973 and 7.8.1978. The learned counsel for first respondent submitted that apart from raising a doubt about the authenticity of the document, the use of such old stamp papers invalidated the agreement itself for two reasons. Firstly, it was illegal to use stamp papers purchased on different dates for execution of a document. Secondly, as the stamp papers used in the agreement of sale were more than six months old, they were not valid stamp papers and consequently, the agreement prepared on such ‘expired’ papers was also not valid. We will deal with the second contention first. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the date on which it was so surrendered. The stipulation of the period of six months prescribed in section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a stamp paper, to use it within six months.

Therefore, there is no impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the proposed date of execution, being used for a document.

12. The Stamp Rules in many States provide that when a person wants to purchase stamp papers of a specified value and a single stamp paper of such value is not available, the stamp vendor can supply appropriate number of stamp papers required to make up the specified value; and that when more than one stamp paper is issued in regard to a single transaction, the stamp vendor is required to give consecutive numbers. In some States, the rules further require an endorsement by the stamp vendor on the stamp paper certifying that a single sheet of required value was not available and therefore more than one sheet (specifying the number of sheets) have been issued to make up the requisite stamp value. But the Indian Stamp Rules, 1925 applicable to Tamil Nadu, do not contain any provision that the stamp papers of required value should be purchased together from the same vendor with consecutive serial numbers. The Rules merely provide that where two or more sheets of paper on which stamps are engraved or embossed are used to make up the amount of duty chargeable in respect of any instrument, a portion of such instrument shall be written on each sheet so used. No other Rule was brought to our notice which required use of consecutively numbered stamp papers in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Stamp Act is a fiscal enactment intended to secure revenue for the State. In the absence of any Rule requiring consecutively numbered stamp papers purchased on the same day, being used for an instrument which is not intended to be registered, a document cannot be termed as invalid merely because it is written on two stamp papers purchased by the same person on different dates. Even assuming that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity, the court can only deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that ground, hold the document to be invalid. Even if an agreement is not executed on requisite stamp paper, it is admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty under section 35 or 37 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. If an agreement executed on a plain paper could be admitted in evidence by paying duty and penalty, there is no reason why an agreement executed on two stamp papers, even assuming that they were defective, cannot be accepted on payment of duty and penalty. But admissibility of a document into evidence and proof of genuineness of such document are different issues.

13. If a person wants to create or a back-dated agreement, the first hurdle he faces is the non-availability of stamp paper of such old date. Therefore tampering of the date of issue and seal affixed by the stamp vendor, as also the entries made by the stamp vendor, are quite common in a forged document. When the agreement is dated 5.1.1980, and the stamp papers used are purchased in the years 1973 and 1978, one of the possible inferences is that the plaintiff not being able to secure an anti-dated stamp paper for creating the agreement (bearing a date prior to the date of sale in favour of second defendant), made use of some old stamp papers that were available with him, to fabricate the document. The fact that very old stamp papers of different dates have been used, may certainly be a circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on the authenticity of the agreement. But that cannot be a clinching evidence. There is also a possibility that a lay man unfamiliar with legal provisions relating to stamps, may bona fide think that he could use the old unused stamp papers lying with him for preparation of the document and accordingly use the old stamp papers.

Re : Point No.(ii)

14. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to ‘opinion of experts’. It provides inter alia that when the court has to form an opinion as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinion upon that point of persons specially skilled in questions as to identity or handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Section 73 provides that in order to ascertain whether a finger impression is that of the person by whom it purports to have been made, any finger impression admitted to have been made by that person, may be compared with the one which is to be proved.

These provisions have been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court.

14.1) In The State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram [1979 (2) SCC 158] this Court held that a court does not exceed its power under section 73 if it compares the disputed writing with the admitted writing of the party so as to reach its own conclusion. But this Court cautioned:

“Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert.”

The caution was reiterated in O. Bharathan vs. K. Sudhakaran 1996 (2) SCC 704. Again in Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka [1997 (7) SCC 110] referring to section 73 of the Evidence Act, this Court held :

“The section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made.

However, looking to the other provisions of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself.

As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the dispute signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act.”

14.2) In Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh – 1980 (1) SCC 704, this Court indicated the circumstances in which the Court may itself compare disputed and admitted writings, thus :

“The argument that the court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusions. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. Where there is none, the court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court’s own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence.”

The decision in Murari Lal (supra) was followed in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [2003 (3) SCC 583].

15. While there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted handwriting/ signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression.

The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the Court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of finger prints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert’s opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal.

16. In this case the first defendant had denied having put her finger impression on Ex. A-1. She died during the pendency of the suit before her turn came for giving evidence. The High Court having examined the document has clearly recorded the finding that the thumb mark in Ex. A-1 was pale (that is light) and not clear. The document though dated 1980, was executed on two stamp papers which were purchased in 1973 and 1978.

Contrary to the recital in the agreement that possession had been delivered to the plaintiff, the possession was not in fact delivered to plaintiff, but continued with the first defendant and she delivered the possession to the second defendant. The title deeds were not delivered to plaintiff. The attesting witnesses were close relatives of plaintiff and one of them was not examined. The scribe’s evidence was unsatisfactory. It was also difficult to believe that the first defendant, an illiterate old woman from a village, would enter into an agreement of sale on 5.1.1980 with plaintiff, and even when he is ready to complete the sale, sell the property to someone else hardly a month thereafter, on 11.2.1980. In this background, the finding by the first appellant court, recorded without the benefit of any expert opinion, merely on a casual perusal, that there appeared to be no marked differences between the two thumb impressions, and therefore Ex. A-1 (sale agreement) must have been executed by first defendant, was unsound. The High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court that the Ex.A1 was executed by first defendant.

Re : Point No.(iii)

17. The trial court had analyzed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first appellate court reversed it by wrongly placing onus on the defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered document put forth by the plaintiff was denied by the defendants, it was for the defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first appellate court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the defendants alleged that the agreement was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will have to prove it. In this case plaintiffs came to court alleging that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale in favour. The first defendant having denied it, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the first defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first defendant to prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. But the various circumstances enumerated by the trial court and High Court referred to earlier, when taken together, rightly create a doubt about the genuineness of the agreement and dislodge the effect of the evidence of PW 1 to 3. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the High Court, reversing the decision of the first appellate court, does not call for interference.

18. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

Related posts:

1.Validity of sale agreement executed on two stamp papers purchased on different dates and more than six months prior to date of execution
2.Stamp duty is applicable on purchase of Property in Public Auction
3.Stamp Duty on purchase of land in SEZ
4.Agreements Valid without Paying Stamp Duty
5.FAQ on Stamp Duty related to Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Bombay Stamp Act, 1958


How to Enable Macros in Microsoft Excel For Income Tax Return (ITR)


 May 24, 2012, 22:36

Income TaxArticlesHOW TO ENABLE MACROS IN MICROSOFT EXCEL FOR RETURN PREPARATION UTILITY

It is necessary to ENABLE the execution of macros in Return-Preparation-Utility in order to enter, validate and generate an .XML file for upload. Follow these steps to ENABLE execution of macros depending on the version of [Microsoft Office Excel] being used to open the Return-Preparation-Utility :
[Microsoft Office Excel 2003]

Navigate through the following excel menu option to reduce the level of security in executing macros :

Tools –> Macros –> Security –> Low

OR

Tools –> Macros –> Security –> Medium

Save the excel-utility and re-open it.

[Microsoft Office Excel 2007]

Navigate through the following excel menu options to reduce the level of security in executing macros :

Excel Options –> Trust Centre –> Trust Centre Settings –> Macro Settings –> Enable all macros

AND

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Taxation of HUF & Family Arrangement

Taxation of Hindu Undivided Family & Family Arrangement
A. INTRODUCTION :
1.    The Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is a special feature of Hindu society. Hindu Undivided Family is defined as consisting of a common ancestor and all his lineal male descendants together with their wives and unmarried daughters. Therefore a Hindu Undivided Family consists of males and females. Daughters born in the family are its members till their marriage and women married into the family are equally members of the undivided family. On the other hand at any given point of time a coparcenary is limited to only members in the four degrees of the common male ancestor.
2.    Hindu : In this term are included all the persons who are Hindus by religion. Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, elaborately declares that it applies to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of Brahmo, Prathana or Arya Samaj, a Buddist,  Jain or Sikh. In CWT. Smt. Champa Kumari Singh (1972) 83 ITR 720, the Supreme Court held that the HUF includes Jain Undivided Family.
3.    Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is a legal expression which has been employed in taxation laws as a separate taxable entity. It is the same thing as “Joint Hindu Family”. It has not been defined under the Income Tax Act, as it has a well defined connotation under Hindu Law.
4.    A Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is a separate entity for taxation under the provisions of sec. 2(31) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This is in addition to an individual as a separate taxable entity, it means that the same person can be assessed in two different capacities viz. as an individual and as Karta of his HUF.
B. How HUF comes into existence:
A Hindu male with his wife and children automatically constitutes the HUF. The HUF is a creature of Hindu Law. It cannot be created by acts of any party save in so far as by adoption or marriage, a stranger may be affiliated  as  a  member  thereof.  An Undivided  Family which is a normal condition of the Hindu society is ordinarily joint not only in estate but in food and worship. The joint family being the result of birth, possession of joint property is only an adjunct of the Joint Family and is not necessary for its constitution.
C.      Basic requirements for the existence of an HUF are as follows :
(i)                Only one co-parcener or member cannot form an HUF Family is a group of people related by blood or marriage. A single person, male or female, does not constitute a family. However the property held by a single co-parcener does not lose its character of Joint Family property solely for the reason that there is no other male or female member at a particular point of time. Once the co-parcener marries, an HUF comes into existence as he alongwith his wife constitutes a Joint Hindu Family as held in the case of  Prem Kumar v. CIT , 121 ITR 347 (All.)
(ii)              Joint Family continues even in the hands of females after the death of sole male member :
Even after the death of the sole male member so long as the original property of the Joint Family remains in the hands of the widows of the members of the family and the same is not divided amongst them; the Joint Hindu Family continues to exist. CIT v. Veerapa Chettiar, 76 ITR 467(SC)
(iii)            An HUF need not consist of two male members- even one male member is enough :
The plea that there must be at least two male members to form an HUF as a taxable entity, has no force. – Gauli Buddanna v. CIT, 60 ITR 347 (SC); C. Krishna Prasad v. CIT 97 ITR 493 (SC) and Surjit Lal Chhabda v. CIT, 101 ITR 776 (SC)
A father and his unmarried daughters can also form an HUF, CIT v. Harshavadan Mangladas, 194  ITR 136 (Guj.)
Further on partition of an HUF a family consisting of a co-parcener and female members is to be assessed in the status of an HUF.
D.      Nucleus of HUF:
It is many times argued that existence of nucleus or joint family property is necessary to recognize the claim of HUF status in respect of any property or income of an HUF. It has been established now that since the HUF is a creature of Hindu Law, it can exist even without any nucleus or ancestral joint family property.
E.      Manager of HUF or Karta :
The person who manages the affairs of the family is known as Karta. Normally the senior most male member of the family acts as Karta. However a junior male member can also act as Karta with the consent of the other member. Narendrakumar J. Modi v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills 57 ITR 510 (SC). However in view of the present social mores and needs of the modern progressive society this decision of the Supreme Court needs to be revised / reviewed.
Besides the same person can be taxed as both individual and Karta of an HUF . The individual and the HUF are two different units of taxation i.e. two different assesses CIT v. Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal 82 ITR 628 (SC).
F.      Joint Family Property :
The following types of properties are generally accepted as joint family property :
(i)                Ancestral property;
(ii)              Property allotted on partition;
(iii)            Property acquired with the aid of joint family property;
(iv)            Separate property of a co-parcener blended with or thrown into a common family hotchpot. The provisions of sec. 64 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 have superseded the principles of Hindu Law, in a case where a co-parcener impresses his property with the character of joint family property.
A female member cannot blend her separate property with joint family property but she can make a gift of it to the HUF. Pushpadevi v. CIT 109 ITR 730 (SC). A female member can also bequeath her property to the HUF, CIT v. G.D. Mukim, 118 ITR 930 ( P & H ).
G.      Branches of HUF:
An HUF can have several branches or sub-branches. For example, if a person has his wife and sons, they constitute an HUF. If the sons have wives and children, they also constitute smaller HUFs. If the grandsons also have wives and children, then even they will also constitute still smaller or sub-branch HUFs. As stated above, the HUF is a creature of Hindu Law and these entities are HUFs alongwith the bigger HUF of the father or the grandfather. It is immaterial whether these smaller HUFs possess any property or not. Property can be acquired by any mode; by partition of bigger HUF or by gifts from any member of the family or even by a stranger or by will with unequivocal intention of the donor or the testator that the said gift or bequest will form the joint family property of the donee or the testatee.
An HUF can be composed of a large number of branch families, each of the branch itself being an HUF and so also the sub-branches of more branches. CIT v. M.M.Khanna 49 ITR 232 (Bom).
H.      Partition of HUF :
Section 171 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 deals with assessment of an HUF, after partition.  Clauses (a) of the explanation to sec.171 defines “Partition” of an HUF. Where the property admits of a physical division, then a physical division of the property thereof, but, where the property does not admit of a physical division then such division as the property admits of, will be deemed to be a “partition”.
`Partition need not be by Metes & bountes, if separate enjoyment can, otherwise the secured and such division is effective so as to bind the members. Cherandas Waridas, 39 ITR 202 (SC).
However the members of an HUF can live separately and such an act would not automatically amount to partition of the HUF. Shiv Narain Choudhary v. CWT 108 ITR 104 (All.)
A finding of partition by the assessing officer u/s. 171 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is necessary.
Partial partition of an HUF has been derecognised by the provisions of sec. 171(9) & moreover, according to sec. 171(9), any partial partition effected after 31.12.78, is not recognized.
Motive or need for partition cannot be questioned by the Income Tax Department. T. G. Sulakhe v. CIT, 39 ITR 394 (AP).
I.       Following methods or devices may prove useful in reducing the tax incidence in the case of HUF :
(i)                By increasing the number of assessable units through the device of partition of the HUF;
(ii)              By creation of separate taxable units of HUF through will in favour of HUF or gift to HUF;
(iii)            Through family settlement / arrangement;
(iv)            By payment of remuneration to the Karta and other members of the HUF;
(v)              By use of loan from HUF to the members of the HUF;
(vi)            Through gift by HUF to its members specially to the female members;
(vii)          Through other methods / devices;
The aforesaid methods / devices are discussed in detail below as follows:
(I) Partition of HUF
In the case of certain HUFs, the tax liability can be reduced by partition of the HUF. This can be easily done in a case where the partition results in separate independent taxable units. Suppose an HUF consists of father and two sons and there are two business establishments, a house property and other sources of income with the HUF. If the members of  the HUF have no other sources of income then partition of the HUF can be done by giving one business establishment to each of the sons, house property to the father and dividing the other sources in such a manner so as to make the partition equitable. Such a partition of HUF will reduce the tax liability considerably.
The position may, however, be different in a case where the members of the HUF have got high individual incomes. In such a case it is not advisable to break or partition the HUF. The HUF should be allowed to continue as a separate taxable unit.
Then there may be a case where the HUF has got only one business establishment which does not admit of a physical division. For the sake of partition the business may be converted into a partnership firm or a company. At present, rate of firm’s tax and the rate of tax in case of a company, is 30% flat, therefore conversion of HUF business into a partnership or a company is not advantageous. The incidence of , in such a case, can be better reduced by payment of remuneration to the members of the HUF.
Partial partition of HUF is also a very effective device for reducing its tax liability. Partial partition is recognized under the Hindu Law. However partial partition of an HUF has been de-recognised by the provisions of sec. 171(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 according to which any partial partition effected after 31.12.78, will not be recognized.
The provisions of sec. 171(9) have been declared ultra-vires by the Madras H.C. in the case of M.V.Valliappan v. ITO, 170 ITR 238. The Supreme Court has granted S.L.P. and stayed the operation of the above decision of Madras H.C. as reported in 171 ITR (St.) 52. The Gujrat H.C. has, however, held the ITAT justified in following the aforesaid decision of Madras H.C., CIT v. M. M. Panchal HUF, 210 ITR 580 (Guj.)
Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 171(9) partial partition, can still be used as a device for tax planning in certain cases. An HUF not hitherto assessed as undivided family can still be subjected to partial partition because it is recognized under the Hindu Law and such partial partition does not require recognition u/s. 171 of the Income Tax Act,1961. Thus a bigger HUF already assessed as such, can be partitioned into smaller HUFs and such smaller HUFs may further be partitioned partially before being assessed as HUFs. Besides any HUF not yet assessed to tax can be partitioned partially and thereafter assessed to tax.
The following legal aspects in respect of partition of HUF, should also be kept in mind while the partition of HUF which are as under :-
(i)                Distribution of the assets of an HUF in the course of partition, would not attract any capital gains tax liability as it does not involve a transfer.
(ii)              On the basis of the same reasoning distribution of assets in the course of partition would not attract any gift tax liability, and
(iii)            There would be no clubbing of incomes u/s. 64 as it would not involve any direct or indirect transfer.
(II)     Creation of HUFs as separate taxable units by will in favour of or gift to HUF :
It is now well settled law that there can be a gift or will for the benefit of a Joint Hindu Family . It is immaterial whether the giver is male or female, whether he or she is a member of the family or an outsider. What matters is the intention of the donor or testator that the property given is for the benefit of the family as a whole.
Suppose there is an HUF consisting of Karta, his wife, his two sons, daughter-in-law and grand children. A gift or will can be made for the benefit of the two smaller HUFs of the sons. The bigger HUF will continue as a separate taxable unit evenafter the death of the Karta.
There may also be a case where the father or mother has got self acquired properties. They have a son and his family but there is no ancestral property as a corpus of their family. Then,  father & mother or both can leave their property for the benefit of their son’s family, through their will (s).
Similar result can be obtained by means of a gift for the benefit of a joint family. It may be pointed out here that an HUF cannot be created by act of parties but a corpus can be created for an already existing HUF through the medium of a gift or will etc.
(III) Through Family Settlement / Arrangement :
Family settlements / arrangements are also effective devices for the distribution of ancestral property. The object of the family settlement should be broadly to settle existing or future disputes regarding property, amongst the members of the family. The consideration for a family settlement is the expectation that such settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst the members of the family. Ram Charan Das v. G.N.Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323 and Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand, AIR 197 SC 1041. Such an agreement is intended to avoid future disputes and to bring about harmony amongst the members of the family . Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481. Briefly stated though conflict of legal claims, present or future is generally a condition for the validity of family arrangement, it is not necessarily so. Even bonafide disputes, present or possible in future, which may not involve legal claims, will also suffice to effect a family arrangement.
As family arrangement does not involve a transfer, there would be no gift and capital gains tax liability or clubbing u/s. 64.
By a family arrangement tax incidence is considerably reduced or it may even be nil. Suppose a family consists of Karta, his wife, two sons and their wives and children and its income is Rs. 6,00,000/-. The tax burden on the family will be quite heavy. If by family arrangement, income yielding property is settled on the Karta, his wife, his two sons and two daughter-in-law, then the income of each one of them would be Rs.100,000/- which would attract no tax & if the assessment year is 2007-08, then the tax liability would be reduced form Rs. 100,000/- to nil.
(IV) By payment of remuneration to the Karta and / or other members of the family :
The other important measure of tax planning for an HUF is to pay remuneration to the Karta and / or other members of the HUF for services rendered by them to the family business. The remuneration so paid would be allowed as a deduction from the income of the HUF and thereby tax liability of the HUF would be reduced, provided the remuneration is reasonable and its payment is bonafide. There is no legal bar against payment of remuneration to the Karta or other members of HUF for services rendered to the family in carrying on the business of the family or looking after the interests of the family in a partnership business. Jugal Kishore Baldeo Sahai v. CIT 63 ITR 238 (SC). The payment must be for service to the family for commercial or business expediency. Jitmal Bhuramal v. CIT 44 ITR 887(SC). Remuneration paid to the Karta or other members of the HUF should be under a valid agreement. The agreement must be valid, bonafide, on behalf of all the members of the HUF and in the interest of and expedient for the family business. Further the payment must be genuine and not excessive. J. K. B. Sahai v. CIT, 63 ITR 238 (SC).
Agreement with whom to be entered:
The agreement should be between the Karta and other members of the family. The agreement need not always be in writing. An agreement to pay salary / remuneration can also be inferred from the conduct of the parties. CIT v. Raghunandan Saran, 108 ITR 818 (All.). However, it would be better if the agreement to pay remuneration is reduced in writing.
For A.Y. 2007-08, if the total income of an HUF is Rs. 5,00,000/- then income tax on HUF would be Rs.1,00,000/-. If salary is paid to four members @ Rs.1,00,000/- net income of HUF would be Rs. 5,00,000  -  Rs.4,00,000 ( 4 x 1,00,000 ) = Rs.1,00,000/-, tax on it would be Rs. NIL. The income of each member would be Rs.1,00,000/-. Therefore tax on members would be NIL. Thus the tax saving would be of Rs.1,00,000/-.
The distinction between ordinary and specified HUF’s has been done away w.e.f. 1.4.1997 i.e. A.Y. 1997-98. For Assessment Year 2007-08 the rate of tax on all HUF’s would be the same as in the case of an individual. This change in the rates of tax has brought a lot of relief to specified HUF’s i.e. the HUF’s with one or more members having taxable income. After the aforesaid amendment whereby the concept of specified HUF’s has been done away with, w.e.f. A.Y. 1997-98 this method of tax planning will be much easier and it will bring more tax relief to the HUF’s.
(V) By loan to the members from the HUF :
If the business, capital or investment of the HUF is expanding then such expansion can be done in the individual names of the members of HUF by giving loans to the members from the HUF. The HUF may or may not charge interest on the loans given.
Where property was purchased by members of HUF with loan from the HUF, which was later on repaid the income from such property would   be  assessable   as   individual   income  of   the   members
L. Bansidhar and Sons v. CIT  123 ITR 58 (Delhi ).
Where after partition of an HUF, two members became partners in three firms on behalf of their respective HUFs and they also became partners in a fourth firm, the funds were obtained by means of loans from other three firms, the share incomes of the members from the fourth firm was assessable as their individual income only.
CIT v. Champaklal  Dalsukhbhai,  81  ITR  293  (Bom.).
(VI) By gift of movable assets of the HUF to its female members:
The Karta of an HUF cannot gift or alienate HUF property but for legal necessity, for pious purposes or in favour of female members
of the family. Gift of immovable property within reasonable limits, can be made by a Karta to his wife, daughter, daughter-in-law or even to a son out of natural love and affection. Gift of immovable property within reasonable limits can be made only for pious purpose e.g. marriage of a daughter.
Therefore, if the HUF has excess funds or property, then, the Karta can make gift of movable assets to his wife, daughter or daughter-in-law at one go or over a period of time. However, it may be noted that with effect from 1.10.98, the applicability of Gift Tax is no more in force. Therefore, no Gift Tax will be payable by a person making the gift from on or after 1.10.98. However, w.e.f. 1.10.2004 Gift received from other than relatives exceeds
Rs.25,000/- then that amount is liable to Income Tax u/s. 57 of Income Tax Act, 1961. It may be remembered that gift for marriage or maintenance of daughter(s) is not liable to Gift Tax. Further clubbing provisions of sec. 64 would not be applicable if the gift in validly made in accordance with the rules of Hindu Law. Besides, if a gift made to the minor daughter of the Karta is valid then the provisions of sec. 60 of the Income Tax Act would not be attracted. CIT v. G. N. Rao, 173  ITR 593 (AP). Whereby, section 60 relates to transfer of income where there is no transfer of assets.
(VII) Through other Methods / Devices :
There are other methods / devices which may be used to reduce the incidence of taxation in the case of an HUF, e.g. :
(i)                Vesting of individual or self-acquired property in a family hotchpots.
(ii)              Family reunion after partition.
(iii)            Through inheritance by succession – Bequests by Will, now recognized by sec. 30 of Hindu Succession Act, can also be utilized for tax-planning.
J.       Properties received under a Will:
The status of the property would be the same as is analysed in the case of properties received by way of gifts as discussed above, that is to say, that the properties will be regarded as the properties of the Hindu Undivided Family only, if the recipient has a son.
K. Properties inherited from an ancestor on the ancestor dying
intestate:
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Chander Sen  (161 ITR 370 )  the person inheriting the property from his ancestor, even if he has a wife and son would receive the property absolutely in his own right and his son would not have any interest in that property.
L. Unequal Distribution on partition :
The Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Gift-Tax v. N. S. Getti Chettiar, 82 ITR 599 held that there is no liability to Gift Tax if there is an unequal distribution of assets amongst members of the family on partition.
M. Reunion : The conditions for a valid reunion are brought
out in the case of CIT v. A. M. Vaiyapuri Chettiar and another 215 ITR 836
The condition precedent for a valid reunion under the Hindu Law are : (1) There must have been a previous state of union. Reunion is possible only among the persons who were on an earlier date members of a Hindu Undivided family ; (2) There must have been a partition in fact ; (3) The Reunion must be effected by the parties or some of them who had made the partition; and (4) There must be a  junction of estate and reunion of property because, reunion is not merely an agreement to live together as tenants in common. Reunion is intended to bring about a fusion in the interest and in the estate among the divided member of an erstwhile Hindu Undivided Family, so as to restore to them the status of an HUF once again and therefore, reunion creates a right in all the reuniting coparcener, in the joint family properties which was the subject matter of partition among them, to the extent they were not dissipated before the reunion.
The reunion effected by the assessee under the deed of reunion was valid. The entire properties of the erstwhile joint family prior to the partition would be the properties of the reunited joint family. The Income Tax Officer might have the option to assess the income arising from the entire properties belonging to the erstwhile joint family prior to the partition in the hands of the reunited, Hindu Undivided Family.
Representative of HUF in a Partnership Firm :
An HUF cannot become a partner in a firm. The Karta or a member of the HUF can represent the HUF in a firm. A female member can also represent HUF in a partnership firm, CIT v. Banaik Industries 119 ITR 282 (Pat.)
Remuneration to Karta or Member from Firm :
Where remuneration was received by a member of HUF from a firm, where he was partner on behalf of HUF for managing firms business such remuneration was his individual income, CIT v. G. V. Dhakappa 72 ITR 192 (SC); Premnath v. CIT 78 ITR 319 (SC).
However, income received by a member of HUF from a firm or company is taxable as the income of the HUF, if it is earned detriment to or with the aid of family funds, otherwise it is taxable as the separate income of the member, P.N. Krishna v. CIT 73 ITR 539 (SC).
HUF and Firm :
Members of HUF can constitute Partnership without effecting a partition or without disturbing the status of joint family. Ratanchand Darbarilal v. CIT 15 ITR 720 (SC). However , on viewing at the present rate of firms tax, conversion of HUF business into partnership is not advantageous.
The Landmark decisions on the subject of HUF are as follows:
(i)                Krishna Prasad v. CIT, 97 ITR 493 (SC)
On partition between father and sons, the shares which sons obtained on partition of the HUF with their father, is the ancestral property. As regards his male issues who take interest in the said property on birth. Therefore one of the sons who was not married at the time of partition will receive the property as his HUF property, however income therefrom will be taxed as the HUF income from the date of his marriage.
(ii)              A.G. v. A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar, 34 ITR 421 (PC)
A Mitakshara joint family consisted of father and son. On death of a son the father and the widow of the son constitute the HUF.
(iii)            Gowli Buddanna v. CIT, 60 ITR 293 (SC)
A Joint family may consist of a single male member with his wife and daughter/ s and it is not necessary that there should be two male members to constitute a joint family.
(iv)            N.V. Narendranath v. CWT, 74 ITR 190 (SC)
The property received by a coparcener on partition of the HUF is the HUF property in his hands vis-à-vis the members of his branch i.e. with his wife and a daughter.
(v)              L. Hirday Narain v. ITO, 78 ITR 26 (SC)
After the partition between the father and his sons, the father and his wife constitute a Hindu Undivided Family which gets enlarged on the birth of a son.
(vi)            CIT v. Veerappa Chettiar, 76 ITR 467 (SC)
Even when a joint family is reduced to female members only it continues to be a HUF.
(vii)          CIT v. Sandhya Rani Dutta, 248 ITR 201 (SC)
Female members cannot create or form an HUF by their acts even under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law.
(viii)        Pushpa Devi v. CIT, 109 ITR 730 (SC)
The right to blend the self-acquired property with HUF property is restricted to a coparcener ( male member of HUF ) and not available to a female member. However, there is no restriction on a female member gifting her property to the HUF of her son.
(ix)            Surjit Lal Chhabda v. CIT, 101 ITR 776 (SC)
The property which was thrown into the common hotchpot was not an asset of a pre-existing joint family of which the assessee was a member. It became an item of joint family property for the first time when the assessee threw what was his separate property into the common family hotchpot. Therefore, the property may change its legal incidence on the birth of the son, but until that event happens, the property, in the eye of Hindu Law, is really the property of the assessee.
II                                    FAMILY ARRANGEMENT
A.      It is arrangement between member of a family descending from a common ancestor or near relation trying to sink their differences and disputes, settle and solve their conflicting claims once and for all to buy peace of mind and bring about harmony and goodwill in the family by an equitable distribution or allotment of assets and properties amongst  member of the family.
B.    FAMILY IN A FAMILY ARRANGEMENT HAS A WIDER MEANING
The Supreme Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi (AIR 1996 SC 323, 329 ) held that : “ Court give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that it’s object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word ‘family’ in this context is not to be understood in the narrow sense of being a group of person who are recongnised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute.” While it is necessary that there should be some common tie between the parties to such family arrangement, it need not be between persons who are commonly understood as constituting a Hindu Family or for that matter, a family in any restricted sense. It is not necessary that there should be a strictly legal claim as member of the same family. It is enough if there is a possible claim or if they are related, a semblance of a claim (Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand AIR 1971 SC 1041, 1045 ).
A family arrangement wherein an adopted son was a party was held to be valid though he turned out to be a stranger as the adoption was subsequently held to be invalid in the case of Shivamurteppa Gurappa Ganiger v. Fakirapaa Basangauda Channappagaudar (AIR 1954 Bom. 430) C.G.T. v. Smt. Gollapude Saritammn (116 ITR 930, 936 AP.)
It is possible that married daughters or sisters who are not treated as members of the family of a parent/ brother on their marriage may still be considered as members of the family for purposes of a family arrangement.
C. ESSENTIALS  OF  A  FAMILY  ARRANGEMENT
(i)                The family arrangement should be for the benefit of the family in general.
(ii)              The family arrangement must be bonafide, honest, voluntary and it should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence.
(iii)            The purpose of the family arrangement should be to resolve present or possible family dispute and rival claims not necessarily legal claims by a fair and equitable division of the property amongst various members.
(iv)            The parties to the family arrangement must have antecedent title, claim or interest. Even if a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement will be sufficient.
(v)              The consideration for entering into family arrangement should be preservation of family property, preservation of peace and honour of the family and avoidance of litigation. Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (AIR 1976 SC 807)
(vi)            Family peace is sufficient consideration
A question arises as to what is the consideration for allotment of property under a family settlement. It is said that a family settlement is arrived at between the members of the family with a view to compromise doubtful and disputed right. It, therefore, follows that the allotment of shares under a family settlement is not what a person is legally entitled to since some of the members can be allotted a much lesser share of asset than what they are entitled to under the law, while others a much larger share than what they are entitled to , yet some others may get a share to which are not legally entitled to since the main consideration is surely and certainly purchase of peace and amity amongst the family members and such a consideration cannot be deemed as being without consideration.
Antecedent title, claim or interest or even a possible claim :
The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest or even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Court will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same. Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (AIR 1976 SC 807).
But where the person, in whose favour certain properties have been transferred under the guise of a family arrangement, has no and cannot have any claim or possible claim against the transferor, & therefore, the same cannot be regarded as a family arrangement.
CED v. Chandra Kala Garg  148 ITR 737 ( All.)
CIT v. R.Ponnammal 164 ITR 706 (Mad.)
In the case of Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh (AIR 1988 SC 881) the Supreme Court held that the parties to family arrangement set up competing to the properties and there was an adjustment of the rights of the parties. By family arrangement  it was intended to set at rest competing claims amongst various members of the family to secure peace and amity. The compromise was on the footing that there was an antecedent title of the parties to the properties and the settlement acknowledged and defined title of each of the parties.
  1. A family settlement is considered as a pious arrangement by all those who are concerned and also by those who administer law. A family settlement is not within the exclusive domain of the Hindu Law but equality applies to all families governed by other religions as well. Thus, it shall apply to Muslims, Christians, Jews, Parsees and other faiths equally.
  2. The concept of family arrangement is an age old one. It is not only applicable to Hindus but also to other communities in which there is a common unit, common mess and joint living. In the case of Bibijan Begum v. Income  Tax Officer (34 TTJ 557), the Gauhati Bench of the Appellate Tribunal in a very elaborate judgement held that there is no bar for Mohammedans to effect a family arrangement. In that case the assessee had an absolute right over her Mehr property and in exchange of that land the assessee received another land over which a multi-storeyed building was to be constructed.  The assessee’s   two daughters and two sons had antecedent right to the properties in the capacity as her heirs though their shares were not specified. The Tribunal held that by a family arrangement the rights of those children had been specified. The family arrangement by which the assessee and her four children received 1/5th share each in the multi-storeyed building was, therefore, valid. The Tribunal therefore, held that the assessee lady could not be assessed in respect of that share of house property which was given to her children pursuant to the family arrangement.
  3. Three parties to the settlement of a dispute concerning the property of a deceased person comprised his widow, her brother and her son-in-law. The latter two could not under the Hindu Law be regarded as the heirs of the deceased, yet, bearing in mind their near relationship to the widow, the settlement of the dispute was very properly regarded as a settlement of a family dispute – Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi AIR 1996 SC 323 at page 329.
  4. A family arrangement differs from partition in as much as in a family settlement there can be a division of income without the distribution of assets and there is no bar to a partial partition. The provision of section 271 of the Act, which places restriction on a partial positions do not apply to a family settlement.
  5. The Gauhati High Court in the case of Ziauddin Ahmed v. CGT, 102 ITR 253 held that the family arrangement amongst the members of Mohammedan family is valid and therefore, the shares given by a father to his sons at less than market value in order to preserve the family peace is not liable to gift tax.
D.      WHETHER DOCUMENT OR REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTING FAMILY ARRANGEMENT
  1. Family arrangement as such can be arrived orally or may be recorded in writing as memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there are no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as  proof  of  what  they  had  arranged  and,  where  the  arrangement  is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it would amount to a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess. Tek Bhadur Bhuji v. Debi Singh AIR 1966 SC 292 . Also see Awadh Narain Singh v. Narian Mishra, AIR 1962 pat. 400; Mythili Nalini v. Kowmari, AIR 1991 Ker 266; Klae v. Dy Director of Consolidation AIR 1976 SC 807.
  2. Another aspect that attracts our attention is whether family arrangement, if recorded in a document, requires registration as per the provisions of section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to create declare, assign, limit or extinguish either in present or in future any right, title or interest in immovable property. Thus if an instrument of family arrangement is recorded in writing and operates or purports to create or extinguish rights, it has to be compulsorily registered. But where a document, merely records the terms and recital of the family arrangement after the family arrangement had already been made which per se does not create or extinguish any right in immovable properties, such document does not fall within the ambit of section 17(1)(b) of the Act and so it does not require registration.
  3. According to the Supreme Court in Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh AIR 1988 SC 881, the true principle that emerges can be stated thus ‘If the arrangement, of compromise is one under which a person having an absolute title to the property transfers his title in some of the items thereof to others, the formalities prescribed by law have to be complied with, since the transferees derive their respective title through the transferor. If, on the other hand, the parties set up competing titles and the differences are resolved by the compromise, then, there is no question of one deriving title from the other and therefore, the arrangement does not fall within the mischief of section 17 (1) (b) it read with section 49 of the Registration Act as no interest in property is created or declared by the document for the first time.
  4. Family Arrangement does not amount to transfer: The transaction of a family settlement entered into by the parties bonafide for the purpose of putting an end to the dispute among family members, does not amount to a transfer Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44, approving, Khunni Lal v. Govind Krishna Narain, (1911) ILR 33 All 356 (PC). It is not also the creation of an interest. For, as pointed out by the Privy Council in Hiran Bibi’s case AIR  1914 PC 44, in a family settlement each party takes a share in the property by virtue of the independent title which is admitted to that extent by the other party. It is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden AIR 1918 PC 196, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a resemblance of a claim on some other ground as say, affection. Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323.
  5. It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of section 17 of the Registration Act and is, therefore not compulsorily registrable –Kale v. Dy. Director AIR 1976 SC 807.
  6. The family arrangement will need registration only if it creates any interest in immoveable property in present in favour of the party mentioned therein. In case however no such interest is created, the document will be valid despite its non-registration and will not be hit by section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Maturi Pullaih v. Maturi Narasimhan AIR 1966 SC 1836.
  7. Even a family arrangement, which was registrable but not registered, can be used for a collateral purpose, namely, for the purpose of showing the nature and character of possession of the parties .In pursuance of the family settlement. Kale v. Director of Consolidation AIR 1976 SC 807, (1976) 3 SCC 119.
  8. To record a family arrangement arrived at orally, a memorandum of family arrangement-cum-compromise is required to be drawn up wherein the properties and assets belonging to the parties to the family arrangement are required to be specified. Thereafter the fact of arriving at family arrangement some time in the past with the help of well-wishers and family friends is required to be mentioned. In the operative portion of the Memorandum of Family Arrangement-cum-Compromise the properties and business which have been allotted to different parties are required to be specified.
In addition to the Memorandum of Family Arrangement –cum-Compromise, other documents like affidavits of each of the parties to the Family Arrangement are required to be obtained wherein each of the parties confirms on oath that he has received a particular asset and the family arrangement is arrived to his total satisfaction and it is binding on him. In such an affidavit the party giving up his right in other properties which are allotted to other parties to the Family Arrangement states that the said other properties may be transferred in the records  of the registering authorities without notice to him. On the basis of the affidavit which is required to be executed before a Notary Public; mutation entries can be made by the concerned authorities.
In order to enable the member of the family to whom a particular property is allotted on arriving at a family arrangement, a power of attorney is required to be given by a member in whose name the said property was standing prior to the family arrangement to enable the party receiving the property to deal with the property as his own. Depending on the facts of each case, various other documents may be required to be drawn up to effect a proper and binding family arrangement.
9. Family arrangement is arrived at for a consideration namely, to resolve the dispute amongst the parties, to preserve the family peace and harmony and to avoid litigation and therefore, the provisions of Gift Tax Act are not attracted.
G.T.O. v. Bhupati Veerbhsadra Rao ( 9 ITD 618 )
C.G. T. v. Pappathi Anni ( 123 ITR 655, Mad )
Ziauddin Ahmed v. CGT ( 102 ITR 253 Gau. )
10.   In the case of N. Durgaiah v. C.G.T. 99 ITR 477 (AP), the assessee executed a registered deed of settlement on March 26, 1962, conveying certain immovable properties to his five sons and two daughters out of whom one of the sons was a minor in whose favour a house worth Rs. 64,800/- was settled. The assessee contended before the G.T.O. that the transaction was in the nature of a family arrangement which does not amount to a taxable gift under the G.T.Act. The G.T.O. A.A.C. and the Tribunal rejected the contention of the Assessee.
When the matter reached the High Court, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that in order to constitute a family arrangement, there must be an agreement or arrangement amongst the members of the joint family who wish  to  avoid  any  plausible  or  possible  disputes and  secure peace and harmony amongst the members. Where one of the parties executes a document styled as settlement deed where under some of the properties exclusively belonging to him as his self acquired properties are settled in favour of the other members of the family, the terms of such document do not amount to a family arrangement. There is no family arrangement as the same is only a unilateral act.
Hence a purely voluntary act of giving up one’s right in property without compelling circumstances indicating an existing or a possible dispute resulting in a compromise may well constitute a conveyance by way of gift and not valid family arrangement. It is, therefore, necessary that the preamble to the family arrangement should advert to the existence of difference which are likely to escalate to possible litigation and cause lack of peace and harmony in the family and likely to bring dishonor to the family name and prestige.
In the case of Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi (Supra), the Supreme Court held that a compromise by way of family settlement is in no sense alienation by a limited owner of the family property and since it is not an alienation it cannot amount to a creation of interest.
The definition of the term “transfer” contained in section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1.4.1988 has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of  Dewas Cine Corporation ( 68 ITR 240), Bankey Lal Vaidya  ( 79 ITR 594 ) & Malbar Fisheries Co. ( 120 ITR 49) wherein the High Court, was called upon to consider whether on dissolution of a firm there is a transfer of assets amongst the partners. The Supreme Court in all the decisions unequivocally held that on dissolution of a firm there is a mutual adjustment of rights amongst the partners and therefore, there is no transfer of assets by sale, exchange, relinquishment of the asset or extinguishments of any rights therein.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Siddharthabhi v. CIT (156 ITR 509) after considering the decisions of their Court in the case of Dewas Cine Corporations, Bankey Lal Vaidya & Malbar Fisheries Co. and the Gujarat High Court decision in the case of Mohanbhai Pamabhai ( 91 ITR 393 ) held,  that  when  a  partner  retires or the partnership is dissolved, what the partner receives is his share in the partnership. What is contemplated here is a share of the partner qua the net assets of the partnership firm. On evaluation, that share in a particular case may be realized by the receipt of only one of all the assets. What happens here is that a shared interest in all the assets of the firm is replaced by an exclusive interest in an asset of equal value. That is why it has been held that there is no transfer. It is the realization of a pre-existing right.
With effect from 1.4.1988 sub-clause (v) is added to the definition of the term “transfer” in section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act which provides that any transaction involving the allowing of the possession of any immovable property to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract amounts to a transfer. Sub-clause (vi) which is added to the definition of the term transfer provides that transaction which has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of any immovable property amounts to a transfer for the purpose of Income Tax Act.
Whether distribution of assets amongst the members of the family amounts to transfer pursuant to the amended definition of the term transfer?
In the case of Ramgowda Annagowda Patil v. Bhausaheb ( AIR 1927 PC 227), the family settlement was between parties which included the brother and son-in-law of a widow of the deceased. Though the widow was a necessary party, her brother and son-in-law were not, but they had been allotted shares in the properties which formed the subject-matter of the family arrangement. It was held that in view of the closeness of the relationship between the persons who were disputing the right over the property with one another, the arrangement between them was legal and enforceable ( Mehdi Hasan v. Ram Ker AIR 1982 All. 92).

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